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Introduction
“We want a fair system of  access to land for the future and justice 
for the wrongs of  the past”. This is one of  thirteen verbatims 
quoted in the Constitution of  Kenya Review Commission’s 
(CKRC) first published report in 2002. The Commission 
was appointed in 2000 by President Daniel arap Moi. The 
struggle for constitutional reform in Kenya had actually 
begun in the late 1980s, pulling together individuals and 
organizations from different sectors of  Kenyan society 
in reaction to the authoritarian nature of  Moi’s regime. 
Owing to patronage construct of  state land allocations, 
the land sector was indeed instrumental in building Moi’s 
authoritative power. The pressure exerted from below 
ultimately forced the executive into discussing structural 
reforms. Non-state actors in Kenya therefore played a 
critical role in propelling the restructuring of  the state.1 
In fact, without the determination of  CSOs Kenya would 
probably have neither a National Land Policy (NLP) nor an 
entire chapter in the Constitution dedicated to land issues. 
The financial and moral support by international donors 
was, undeniably, a crucial factor in the scope and success of  
this mobilization. 
Although they progressed at very different speeds, the 
reform of  the land sector and the revision of  the Constitu-
tion have been entangled. They occurred during the same 
period and, most importantly, land policies have substan-
tially informed Kenya’s state building since colonialism. 
The path dependency of  Kenyan property rights institu-
tions is critical in understanding the Kenyan land struggle.2 
1. Mutua, M. Kenya’s Quest fro Democracy. Taming Leviathan. Lynne Rienner 
Publisher, 2008.
2. Onoma, A.K. The Politics of  Property Rights Institutions in Africa. 
Cambridge Press, 2009.
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The colonial strategy of  domination through dispossession 
of  communities’ land was somehow perpetuated by the 
postcolonial elite, which made of  land a resource to build 
patronage networks. Kenya’s governments “have used 
their discretionary powers over land allocation […] as an 
instrument of  distributive politics”,3 and the practice of  
“land grants from above”4 constituted the basis of  the 
ethnicization of  politics until it reached a crisis point that 
made policy intervention almost inevitable.5 
My three-month fieldwork in Kenya (mainly undertaken 
in Nairobi, with a few trips to Nakuru to visit some key 
CSOs’ headquarters) was aimed to shed light on the Formu-
lation Process of  the NLP (FPNLP). I investigated how the 
land policy was elaborated through a thoughtful and delibe-
rative process that allowed grassroots actors to participate 
in the policy-making decisions. I also sought to understand 
why, at present, the reform process has reached a deadlock 
over the mandate of  the newly appointed National Land 
Commission (NLC), which seems to conflict with the func-
tions of  the Ministry of  Land.
The NLP formulation process
During his almost twenty-five-year long administration, 
President Moi built an oppressive and authoritative regime. 
Moreover, following in the footsteps of  Jomo Kenyatta, Moi 
used the land resource to entrench his power. Beyond the 
3. Boone, C. “Land Conflict and Distributive Politics in Kenya.” African 
Studies Review 55, no. 1 (2012).
4. Kanyinga, K. Re-Distribution from Above. The Politics of  Land Rights 
and Squatting in Coastal Kenya. Research Report n° 115, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2000.
5. Médard, C. “Quelques clés pour démêler la crise kenyane.” In Les 
élections générales de 2007 au Kenya, ed. J. Lafargue; 75-88. Nairobi: IFRA, 
Paris: Karthala, 2008.
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land-related corruption phenomenon (or ‘land grabbing’), 
Moi’s political practices exacerbated the land problem by 
ethicizing the land question. After the introduction of  
multipartyism, interethnic violence increased. Some ethno-
cultural groups were stigmatized and in the aftermath of  
the 1992 and 1997 elections, arbitrary evictions and mass 
executions were perpetrated. The toll of  the violence was so 
heavy that the government had to provide an institutional 
response to calm public opinion. Moi set up a commission 
of  inquiry to investigate into post-electoral ‘tribal clashes’. 
This commission demonstrated the ethnicisation of  land 
in Kenya.6 Furthermore, in 1999, Moi also appointed a 
Commission of  Inquiry into the Land Law System of  Kenya 
(or the “Njonjo Commission”, named after its Chairman 
Charles M. Njonjo). This Commission constituted a 
sort of  jurisprudential precedent : for the first time, an 
official document issued from the circles of  power stated 
the need for a revision of  the land legislation and for its 
harmonization towards a comprehensive policy. Another 
promising development, contributing to the setting of  land 
reform was the inclusion of  land issues in the framework 
of  the constitutional revision work of  the CKRC. 
Prof. Okoth-Ogendo is one of  Kenya’s most respected 
law scholars who served as land expert in the constitutional 
review process. He drove the process in institutional fora, 
and greatly contributed to generating the land reform 
momentum by propelling non-state actors involvement. 
In a review for DFID-Kenya, Okoth-Ogendo advocated 
for a radical transformation of  land relations through 
comprehensive reforms.7 DFID was the first donor to 
engage with the land sector from a governance perspective. 
Its objective of  ‘assuring the security of  the access to land’ 
was intended to be achieved ‘by establishing an effective 
land advocacy network in Kenya to defend and uphold the 
land rights of  the poor and other disadvantaged groups 
and to campaign for policy and legal reforms that meet 
their needs and interests’.8 The land advocacy network is 
the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA), which has been the most 
engaged CSO within the FPNLP. The KLA was officially 
launched in May 1999, with the support and funding of  
Oxfam GB.
The reform momentum reached its climax in the first 
half  of  the 2000s. 2002 was the year of  many turning 
points that catalyzed the reform process. In May 2002 the 
first Land Reform Conference, organized by the KLA, 
took place (officially called the National Civil Society 
Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question). The 
CKRC Report was published in September 2002. Chapter 
11 of  the Constitution Draft proposed far reaching 
changes to the current constitutional requirements on land 
6. Kameri-Mbote, P. “Trouble in Eden. How and Why Unresolved Land 
Issues Landed ‘Peace-Full Kenya.” In Trouble in 2008, Forum for Develop-
ment Studies. International Environmental Law Research Centre, 2008.
7. The Department For International Development (DFID) is UK’s 
development agency. See DFID, Project Completion Report & DFID Support 
to the Kenya Land Reform Process. Nairobi, 2003.
8. Ibid.
and property. In November 2002, the Njonjo Report was 
published and its recommendations somewhat convergent 
with the Constitution Draft. In October 2002, the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was set up out, bringing 
together the National Alliance Party (composed of  various 
opposition parties and some of  the most significant CSOs’ 
exponents) and the Liberal Democratic Party of  Raila 
Odinga, dissident of  Moi’s Kenya African Democratic 
Union (KANU). In December 2002, the NARC actually 
won the general elections, thus marking the end of  the 
almost forty-year long KANU regime.
The NARC victory helped institutionalizing the land 
reform process. Not only had the land reform been an asset 
during the NARC electoral campaign, but the progressive 
and reformist wing of  the NARC coalition prompted the 
new government to cooperate with donors and CSOs. 
Another important sign of  commitment to reforms 
was the appointment of  the Commission of  Inquiry 
into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of  Public Land, or 
Ndung’u Commission (after its chairman Paul Ndung’u) 
by President Mwai Kibaki following the Njonjo Report 
recommendations. For donors , the shift in the government 
approach to land reform was palpable and encouraging.
In the meanwhile, non-state actors had started putting 
pressure on the political establishment to undertake the 
process of  land reform. These actors were: the KLA, 
backed by DFID; the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA); and a few other development 
partners, alongside with professional bodies, such as the 
Law Society of  Kenya (LSK), the Kenyan Institute of  
Planners (KIP) and the Institution of  Surveyors of  Kenya 
(ISK). The FPNLP was launched on February 2004 and was 
designed to include the civil society in the policy-making 
process. Land issues were divided and schematized in six 
broad themes . In 2005, 13 regional consultations were 
held countrywide, thus enabling citizenz to participate in 
the process. In April 2007, the NLP Draft was adopted by 
a national stakeholders’ symposium, where representatives 
of  all social and cultural Kenyan constituencies endorsed 
the document.9 The Final Draft of  the NLP was finally 
produced by the NLP Secretariat in May 2007.
Politicizing the Land Policy
From a legal standpoint, the Njonjo Report along with 
the 2002 CKRC Report and the Ndgung’u Report reveal 
the foundations of  the NLP’s proposals for addressing 
land issues in Kenya. Among the most critical concerns 
of  the land law system were the centralization of  land 
transactions in the Ministry and Lands Departments and 
the concentration of  power in the hands of  the President 
and the Commissioner of  Lands regarding allocations of  
public and trust land, which actually led to abuses. The 
Njonjo Commission recommended the establishment of  
9. Mwathane, I. The Contribution of  Land to the Recent Violence in Kenya: 
Implications For the Ongoing Land Policy Dialogue. Land Development 
Governance Institute (LDGI), Nairobi, Kenya, 2010.
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the Land Sector Non State Actors (LSNSAs) that united 
CSOs and professional bodies  and was aimed at galva-
nizing non-state actors’ action towards the approval of  
the NLP. SIDA put some fuel in the reform movement 
machine to help restart the engine and intensively advo-
cate for the Policy to be endorsed. This actually worked 
out well.
The NLP Draft became Sessional Paper n°3 in 2009 
after its endorsement by the Kenyan Cabinet Government 
and approval by Parliament. The two-year gap between 
the finalization (May 2007) and the approval of  the Policy 
(December 2009) was principally caused by what many 
interviewees have identified as the “politics coming in” 
factor. First, given its opportunistic nature, the “marriage 
of  convenience” between the two camps composing the 
NARC coalition did not last. Tensions became harsher 
during debates about Kenya’s new constitution at the 
Bomas National Delegates Constitutional Conference 
in 2005 as each camp wanted to take control. The Draft 
Constitution was eventually rejected when submitted to 
Kenyans through the referendum of  November 2005. 
Not only was the NARC government experiencing 
serious cracks, but “the rejection of  the proposed draft 
constitution […] meant that the land chapter which 
significantly contributed to the draft land policy reforms 
was not adopted”.11
Paradoxically the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence 
boosted the reform process because issues related 
to land rights were perceived as the root causes of  
conflict in Kenya. As a result, the need to reform land 
institutions was mentioned in the Kenya National 
Dialogue Reconciliation Agreement of  2008. The post-
crisis government of  national unity NARC embarked in 
an ambitious course of  reform: the NLP was approved in 
2009, while the new Constitution was drafted in less than 
two years and adopted in August 2010.
The origins of  the inter-institutional conflicts 
experienced at present between the recently established 
NLC (whose Chairman, Mohamed Swazuri, and other 
Commissioners assumed office in August, 2012), and the 
Ministry of  Lands (represented by Charity Ngilu, Minister 
of  the Jubilee government elected in 2013) lie in the period 
going from the Policy endorsement to the Constitution 
revision finalization. The post-crisis coalition of  2008 was 
composed, on the one hand, of  a very progressive wing 
and, on the other, of  a conservative wing which did not 
want to see the creation of  a powerful NLC charged with 
operationalizing the Ndung’u Report recommendations. 
As a result of  the hidden agenda of  some coalesced 
interests, the powers of  the NLC were consistently 
reduced in Chapter 5 of  the 2010 Constitution tion, thus 
creating confusion in the functions and roles of  both the 
institutions. The importance of  NARC government in 
11. Ministry of  Land Settlement. National Land Policy Formulation 
Process, Concept Paper, Nairobi: Ardhi House, 2004.
an independent body to take over some of  the key functions 
of  the Ministry of  Lands and existing abuses. Furthermore, 
the Njonjo Report recommended that improper allocations 
be suppressed, and in some cases the land given back to 
its original owner. The Ndung’u Commission asserts that 
“sanctity of  title depends on its legality and not otherwise. 
A title acquired illegally is not valid in the eyes of  the law”.10 
The Ndung’u Report was very documented, showing how 
Kenyan public officers had betrayed the Public Trust Doc-
trine in the allocation of  public land. It recommends the 
establishment of  a Land Titles Tribunal that would embark 
in the process of  revocation of  unlawful titles; it also sug-
gested that a National Land Commission (NLC) be created 
and vested in the power of  managing the allocation of  pu-
blic and trust land. Other crucial recommendations thereaf-
ter enshrined in the Policy were: the impediment for forei-
gners to own land, allowing only leasehold titles in urban 
areas and recommending the minimization of  the delay in 
granting a renewal.
Daily Nation, 7th October 2004
When describing the Policy making process as consul-
tative and inclusive of  all Kenyan constituencies, this does 
not actually include the opinion of  one lobby group called 
the Kenya Land Owners Association (KELA). The KELA 
was created by landowners who felt that the views of  the 
“people who actually own the land other than communi-
ties” was not taken into consideration . It represented the 
interests of  British farmers who opposed the Policy: they 
opposed the disposition reducing leases grant time from 999 
years to 99 years (considered insufficient for investments), 
and also the creation of  a too powerful NLC (not legiti-
mized by electoral accountability) . As a result of  KELA’s 
lobby activities, DFID exited the FPNLP. When, in 2007, 
SIDA replaced DFID, the KLA sought its support to form 
10. Republic of  Kenya (RoK). Report into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation 
of  Public Land (Chairman P. Ndung’u). Nairobi : Government Printer, 3 
volumes, 2004.
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Cartoon by Gado, 20th March 201412
propelling the land reform has, therefore, to be nuanced: promise of  democratizing the land sector had been, in 2002, an 
‘easy’ campaign manifesto against Moi, but the Policy dispositions certainly scared state and non-state actors who wanted to 
maintain the status quo. The relative apathy of  these actors during the FPNLP is due to the non-legislative nature of  the NLP, 
which was only a comprehensive guide for the Kenyan legislator. When it came to the Constitution and legislation making 
process, interventions were made to reduce the hit of  both the Constitutional Chapter on land and the laws supposed to 
enact the Policy . 
Conclusion
As Ambreena Manji stresses out in a recently published article, the land laws (namely, the Land Act, the Land Registration 
Act and the NLC Act of  2012) “seemed to be almost entirely disconnected from the NLP”.13 Moreover, instead of  clarifying 
the mandate of  the NLC, the laws left the contentious issues unaddressed. This leaves a grey zone regarding the definition 
of  whose institution holds the power to manage and allocate public land. Notwithstanding the irresistible grass-root reform 
movement, appealing many sectors of  Kenyan society and almost unanimously supported by development partners, the 
landed oligarchy managed to hold a solid grip on the Kenyan political system, manifesting itself  only when necessary to tilt 
the balance in its favor. 
12. Charity Ngilu is the Minister of  Lands, Housing and Urban Development in the Jubilee government elected in 2013 and Mohammed Swazuri the 
NLC Chairman. Cartoon available at http://gadocartoons.com/ngilu-vs-swazuri-landbarons
13. Manji, A. “The Politics of  Land Reform in Kenya 2012.” African Studies Review 57, no. 1 (2014).                                                                             
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